









Environment and Production Technology Division 
 
International Food Policy Research Institute 
2033 K Street, N.W. 












 EPTD Discussion Papers contain preliminary material and research results, and are circulated 
prior to a full peer review in order to stimulate discussion and critical comment.  It is expected that most 





COMMUNITY NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT:  
THE CASE OF WOODLOTS IN NORTHERN ETHIOPIA 
 
 







This paper examines the nature of community management of woodlots and 
investigates the determinants of collective action and its effectiveness in managing 
woodlots, based on a survey of 100 villages in Tigray, northern Ethiopia.  We find that 
collective management of woodlots generally functions well in Tigray.  Despite limited 
current benefits received by community members, the woodlots contribute substantially 
to community wealth, increasing members’ willingness to provide collective effort to 
manage the woodlots.  We find that benefits are greater and problems less on woodlots 
managed at the village level than those managed at a higher municipality level, and that 
the average intensity of management is greater on village-managed woodlots.   Nevertheless, 
we find little evidence of differences in collective management of woodlots or its 
effectiveness on village vs. municipality-managed woodlots, after controlling for other 
factors.  The factors that do significantly affect collective action include population density 
(higher collective labor input and lower planting density at intermediate than at low or high 
density), market access (less labor input, planting density and tree survival where market 
access is better), and presence of external organizations promoting the woodlot (reduces local 
effort to protect the woodlot and tree survival).  The finding of an inverse U-shaped 
relationship between population density and collective labor input is consistent with induced 
innovation theory, with the increased labor/land ratio promoting collective effort to invest in 
resources as population density grows to a moderate level, while incentive problems may 
undermine collective action at high levels of population density.  The negative effect of 
market access suggests that higher opportunity costs of labor and/or increased “exit 
options” undermine collective resource management.  The negative effect of external 
organizational presence suggests that external organizations are displacing local efforts to 
protect woodlots.  These findings suggest collective action may be more beneficial and more 
effective when managed at a more local level, when the role of external organizations is more 
demand-driven, and when promoted in intermediate population density communities more 
remote from markets.  In higher population density settings and areas closer to markets, 
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COMMUNITY NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT:  





** and Girmay Tesfaye
*** 
 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
Common property resources
1 are important sources of timber, fuelwood, and 
grazing land in developing countries. Under unrestricted access by community members, 
or ineffective use regulations, these resources are exploited on a first-come, first-served 
basis. Each individual user of the resource will tend to continue to utilize the resource 
until her average revenue is equal to the marginal cost of utilizing the resource (Gordon, 
1954). This results in overexploitation of the resource and the scarcity rent of the 
resource becomes dissipated. 
The solution to the problem of resource degradation in developing countries 
depends not only on appropriate technologies and efficient market prices, but also on 
local level institutions of resource management and the organizations to enforce them 
(Baland and Platteau, 1996; Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995).  Community resource 
management institutions and organizations are now receiving greater attention as a viable  
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alternative to regulation by the state or privatization as a means of rectifying inefficiencies 
caused by attenuated property right systems, externalities, and other market failures. 
However, devolving rights to local communities to help build institutions for 
common property management may not be a sufficient condition for sustainable use of 
such resources.  Effectiveness in internal governance is needed for the effective 
application of community rules (Swallow and Bromley, 1995; Turner et al., 1994).  
Hence, the need to identify factors that facilitate or hinder the development and 
effectiveness of local organizations becomes important.  
In Ethiopia, rural communities depend primarily on common property resources 
for irrigation water, construction material, fuelwood and grazing land. Population 
pressure, market and government failures, and the absence or ineffectiveness of use 
regulations of common property resources has resulted in severe degradation of the 
resources. Perhaps as a result, Ethiopia has been identified as the country with the most 
environmental problems in the Sahel belt (Hurni, 1985).  
Resource degradation is particularly severe in the northern region of Tigray.  Soil 
erosion, soil nutrient depletion, moisture stress, deforestation and overgrazing are major 
environmental problems in the region (Fitsum Hagos, et al. 1999). Currently forests and 
woodlots cover less than 2% of the regional area (BoANRD, 1995). The region depends 
almost entirely on imported construction material. Severe shortage of fuelwood has 
rendered rural communities increasingly dependent on animal dung for fuel, contributing to 
the problem of declining soil fertility (Fitsum Hagos, et al. 1999; Berhanu Gebremedhin, 
1998).  Despite the fact that about 40% of the total land area is used for grazing (BoANRD, 





The Tigray region is known not only for severe resource degradation, but also for 
concerted efforts to redress the problem, especially since 1991.  Major strategies of 
environmental rehabilitation include construction of stone terraces, soil bunds, and micro 
dams; establishment of area enclosures (areas enclosed from human and animal 
interference to promote natural regeneration) and community woodlots (enclosures with 
enrichment plantation of trees or areas of new plantation); and enforcement of grazing 
restrictions (Berhanu Gebremedhin, 1998).  Since 1991, the role of local communities in 
resource management has been increasing, particularly in the management of area 
enclosures, woodlots and grazing lands. However, little evidence exists regarding the 
nature of local level institutions and organization for resource management in Tigray, or 
their effectiveness.  More generally, there is still a paucity of such evidence for 
developing countries, despite increased attention in the literature to issues of common 
property resource management in recent years. 
This paper seeks to address this lack of evidence on management of common 
property resources in developing countries.  The paper has two inter-related objectives. 
First, it evaluates the nature and impact of community management in the regeneration of 
woodlots in Tigray, considering the benefits to communities from these areas and 
problems encountered.   Second, it investigates using econometric methods the 






2.   THE SETTING 
The study area, Tigray, is found in northern Ethiopia on the Sudano-Sahelian 
drylands zone (Warren and Khogali, 1992). It covers an approximate area of 80,000 sq. km, 
with a population of more than 3.3 million and annual population growth rate of 3%.  The 
topography of the region is characterized as mountainous plateau and the climate as tropical 
semi-arid (Virgo and Munro, 1978). Annual rainfall ranges from 450 to 980 mm with 
significant spatial and temporal variability (Berhanu Gebremedhin, 1998).  Most of the 
precipitation falls within the three months of June, July and August, and with high intensity.  
Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy of Tigray. More than 85% of the regional 
population depends on rainfed mixed crop-livestock subsistence agriculture, with oxen power 
supplying the only draft power for plowing. Except for some areas in the Western and 
Southern zones of the region which produce surplus during good rainfall years, the rest either 
produce just enough for subsistence during good rainfall years or face chronic food deficit. 
The causes of the structural food deficit include severe environmental degradation, low soil 
fertility, inadequate and erratic rainfall, vulnerability to pests, lack of appropriate technology, 
small size and fragmentation of land holding, lack of diversification in economic activities, 
lack of oxen for draft power and little use of modern inputs.  
About 40% of the total area of the region is used for grazing (BoANRD, 1995). 
Most of the crop residue is used as feed, fuel or construction material. Several areas of 
the highland plateau of Tigray are said to have been covered with forests at the turn of the 
century (Wolde-Giorgis, 1993). Currently forests and woodlots cover only about 1.6% of 





implements, and clearing forests to expand agricultural land have exhausted the forest 
cover of the area. Forests, woodlots and grazing lands have been predominantly common 
property resources or open access resources in the region.  
Since 1991, the Ethiopian government has embarked on an economic development 
strategy known as Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization (ADLI), which places 
greater emphasis on agricultural development. Within the framework of the ADLI, regional 
administrations have been able to draw economic strategies specific to their conditions. 
Conservation-based ADLI became the primary goal of economic development in Tigray, 
which focuses on conservation of natural resources and popular participation. The natural 
resource conservation and development effort in the region has been aimed at improving the 
management of soil and water resources, environmental rehabilitation and protection through 
area enclosures and development of community woodlots, the development of irrigation 
through the construction of micro dams and river diversions, and reforestation.  Other 
elements in the regional ADLI include improving productivity in agriculture through 
improved agricultural practices and inputs, promoting off-farm employment through 
diversification of the rural economy, and development of rural infrastructure. 
The experience with area enclosures and community woodlots in Ethiopia during 
the previous military government was disappointing.  Within five years after the 1985 
famine, more than 80,000 ha of hillsides were closed to most forms of use to foster the 
regeneration of indigenous plant species.  By 1995, most of the enclosures and 
community woodlots were harvested or destroyed (Hoben, 1995). The factors responsible 
for the poor performance of the environmental reclamation program include inadequate 





ecological conditions, and disregard of the views and interests of the rural population 
whom the program was intended to serve. Program implementation was top-down, 
authoritarian and politicized.   
Since 1991, area enclosures and community woodlots in Tigray have been 
developed through a more participatory process.  A development agent of the Bureau of 
Agriculture and Natural Resource Development (BoANRD), in collaboration with the 
local tabia baito (local administration council), identify an area to be closed and/or 
planted. The final decision is then made at a general meeting of the community members. 
Site preparation for community plantation including construction of microbasins, 
terraces, and digging holes usually begins in late April of each year. Between 1992 and 
1996, about 49 million seedlings are reported to have been planted in community 
woodlots (BoANRD, 1996).  The average survival rate is reported to have been around 
40%, but can be as low as 10% in the lowland areas.  
Guards who protect area enclosures or community woodlots are nominated from 
the local people and the community is expected to contribute for the payment of the 
guards. In areas where community contributions for guard payment are not forthcoming, 
site guards are either allowed to cut grass from the enclosure for private use or graze 
animals. In some cases, government or non-government organizations pay for the guard 
based on food-for-work programs.  
The area enclosures and community woodlots were established primarily for 
ecological regeneration rather than economic benefits. However, people’s expectations 





management challenge in terms of technical inputs and institutional arrangements for 
utilization and distribution of benefits. 
The development of community woodlots requires tree seedlings. Three types of 
tree nurseries operate in Tigray: state, community and private (BoANRD, 1996). Until 
1996, about 210 state nurseries with an average land area of half a hectare and a potential 
to produce more than 390,000 seedlings per year at full capacity had been operating in 
the region. State nurseries now sell seedlings to farmers. Community nurseries were 
launched in order to decentralize seedling distribution and reduce problems in seedling 
transportation. By 1996, about 446 community nurseries were operational with an 
average area of 0.04 ha and capacity of 60,000 to 80,000 seedlings per year. Community 
nurseries receive material and technical support from the BoANRD while the local 
community contributes labor and management. In addition to state and community 
nurseries, individual farmers raise their own seedlings, although on a limited scale.  
Low survival rates and poor tree establishment in community woodlots appear to 
have encouraged a different tree planting arrangement in the region.  Distribution of 
degraded communal lands, mostly gullies, for private tree plantation is now being 
practiced in the region. The initiative began in a village known as Echmare in 
Gulomekeda woreda (district) of the Eastern zone of Tigray in 1992 (BoANRD, 1996). 
The community, upon observation of the benefits of private tree plantation, divided 
communal land, in parcels of 3m by 6m, to individuals for tree plantation. This initiative 
later was accepted at the regional level and distribution of communal land for private tree 





There appears to be ambiguity in tree tenure rights in Tigray. Although a farmer 
has the ownership right to trees grown on his homestead and cultivated lands, he or she 
needs to get permission from the local baito to cut the trees. Regional laws also prohibit 
planting eucalyptus and cactus trees on cultivated land. The regional effort to plant trees 
has not been accompanied by proper incentives to encourage tree plantation by 
households or the community at large. 
 
3.   RESEARCH METHODS AND HYPOTHESES 
METHODS 
This study is based on a survey of 50 tabias (the lowest administrative unit in 
Tigray, comprising usually four or five villages) in the highlands
2 of Tigray in the 1998-
99 cropping season. Sample tabias were selected based on random sampling stratified by 
proximity to a market town and presence of an irrigation project.  Within each tabia, two 
villages were selected randomly. A semi-structured questionnaire was administered with 
representative individuals at both levels.  Each interview involved ten respondents chosen 
to represent different age groups, villages, primary occupations and gender. The survey 
collected information about changes in agricultural and natural resource conditions 
between 1991 and 1998, and their causes and effects.   
Analysis of descriptive information from the survey was used to identify the 
nature of management of woodlots, the roles of different organizations (local and  
                                                   
 





external) in managing them, and the benefits and problems encountered.  Econometric 
analysis was used to investigate the determinants of collective action and its effectiveness 
in managing woodlots.  The indicators of collective action and effectiveness used in the 
econometric analysis include the amount of uncompensated collective labor per capita 
invested in managing the woodlot, whether the community pays for a guard to protect the 
woodlot, whether there were any violations of the restrictions on use of the woodlot, the 
number of trees planted per hectare on the woodlot since its establishment, and the 
survival rate of the trees planted.    
The type of regression model used depends on the nature of the dependent 
variable.  We use a tobit model to explain collective labor investment and survival rate, 
since these variables are left-censored at zero.  We use binary probit models to explain 
whether the community pays for the guard or whether there were violations of 
restrictions, since these are binary variables.  We use least squares regressions for tree 
planting density, since this variable is not censored.  In all regressions, coefficients and 
standard errors were corrected for the sampling weights and stratification, and the 
standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and non-independence of multiple 
observations from the same primary sampling unit (tabia). 
HYPOTHESES 
The factors used to explain variations in collective action and its effectiveness 
included population density, access to market, agricultural potential, the presence of 
external organizations, whether the woodlot is managed at the village or tabia level, and 





collective action draw from the literature on induced institutional innovation and 
collective action in managing common property resources (Boserup, 1965; Hayami and 
Ruttan, 1985; North, 1990; Olson, 1965; Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995; Baland 
and Platteau, 1996; Pender and Scherr, 1999; Pender, 1999; Otsuka and Place, 1999).  At 
low levels of population density, the demand for collective action to manage resources 
will be low, and the organizational costs of attaining it high.  As population density 
grows, increasing land scarcity will increase the benefits of improved resource 
management, whether through collective action or development of private property.  This 
may induce increased collective action, particularly if economies of scale or high 
exclusion costs favor collective over private management.  However, as population 
density grows to very high levels, the gains from collective action may be outweighed by 
the incentive problems associated with it, as rising scarcity increases the benefits from 
attempting to “free-ride” on the efforts of others.  The economies of scale of collective 
action may diminish, or be replaced by diseconomies of scale at higher population 
density.  As a result, the net benefits of collective action may stabilize or even decline 
while the net benefits of privatization continue to increase with increasing population 
density.  Thus, there may be an “inverse U relation” between collective action and 
population density, with higher levels and effectiveness of collective action at 
intermediate population density than at very low or very high density (Pender, 1999). 
Access to markets may also have mixed effects on collective action.  On one hand, 
having better access to markets increases the value of resources and thus the value of 
managing resources well, which may favor collective action.  On the other hand, better 





opportunity cost of labor or by offering more “exit” options, making it more difficult to 
punish those who fail to cooperate (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Pender and Scherr, 1999).  
Thus, the impact of market access on collective action can only be determined empirically.  
Agricultural potential may have mixed impacts on collective action for similar reasons. 
The presence of external organizations may favor collective action when those 
organizations are seeking to provide complementary inputs to local collective inputs, but 
may undermine collective action if external organizations are providing substitutes for 
collective action, or otherwise undermining collective action (such as by increasing the 
“exit options” of local community members, as noted above) (Pender and Scherr, 1999).  
We expect that collective action is easier to obtain and likely to be more effective 
when cooperation of a smaller number of people is needed, when the beneficiaries are a 
more homogenous and stable group, and when the benefits received by those people are 
more apparent (Olson, 1965; Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995; Baland and Platteau, 
1996).  Thus, we expect that collective action will be more prevalent and more effective 
for village-managed woodlots than for tabia-managed woodlots, since villages are 
smaller, more cohesive and a more stable unit than tabias (e.g., the tabias were 
reorganized in 1995 to include more villages) and since, as noted below, the benefits 
accruing to community members from village-managed woodlots have been greater than 
the benefits from tabia-managed woodlots. 
To the extent that economies of scale are important in favoring collective action 
(for example, in protecting the woodlot), we expect that collective action should be 






4.   RESULTS 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Almost nine out of ten tabias in the highlands of Tigray have woodlots (Table 1).  
There are nine woodlots per tabia on average, and these average about 8 ha. in size, 
although there is much variation in numbers and sizes of woodlots across communities.   
Table 1: Characteristics of community woodlots 
 







Percentage of tabias with a woodlot   57.7   29.9   87.6 
   (8.1)   (7.2)   (5.8) 
       
Number of woodlots per tabia   7.2   0.9   9.0 
   (1.3)   (0.2)   (1.3) 
       
Area of woodlots (ha)   5.1   18.5   7.9 
   (0.9)   (3.8)   (1.4) 
       
Percentage of woodlots established since 
1991   75.6   91.3   78.0 
   (8.8)   (5.2)   (7.6) 
       
Percentage of woodlots promoted by   94.6   98.7   95.5 
a program or organization   (3.8)   (1.4)   (3.0) 
  - promoted by BoANRD   76.5   91.4   79.5 
   (8.7)   (7.4)   (7.2) 
  - promoted by REST   4.6   0.0   3.7 
   (3.7)   (0.0)   (3.0) 
  - promoted by BoANRD and REST   4.8   7.3   5.3 
   (4.6)   (7.2)   (3.9) 
  - promoted by World Vision   4.8   0.0   3.8 
   (4.6)   (0.0)   (3.7) 
Percentage of woodlots where users are:     
  - All tabia members   0.0   94.8   19.6 
   (0.0)   (5.3)   (6.4) 
  - Only village members   100.0   0.0   79.1 
   (0.0)   (0.0)   (6.4) 
  - Only the guard   0.0   5.2   1.1 
   (0.0)   (5.3)   (1.1) 





Most of the woodlots have been established since the fall of the former Derg government 
in 1991.   The establishment of most woodlots has been promoted by external 
organizations; usually the Tigray Regional Bureau of Agriculture and Natural Resource 
Development (BoANRD).  In a few cases, non-government organizations, including the 
Relief Society of Tigray (REST) or World Vision, were involved. 
Most woodlots are managed at the village level by the village council, and are 
used only by members of that village.  However, about one third of the tabias that have 
woodlots manage them at the tabia level, in which case the tabia council is responsible 
for management.   In almost all cases, all members of the tabia are allowed to use the 
tabia-managed woodlots, though in a few cases, only the guard is allowed to use the 
woodlot.  Tabia-managed woodlots tend to be larger than village-managed ones, 
averaging more than 18 ha. in size compared to about 5 ha. for village woodlots. 
The most common use allowed on woodlots is to cut and collect grass for animal 
feed, roof materials or other purposes (Table 2).  Collecting fruits and beekeeping in 
woodlots are also commonly allowed.  These uses are more common on village-managed 
than tabia-managed woodlots.  Most other uses, including cutting trees, shrubs, branches, 
or roots; and collecting fuelwood, bark, leaves, or dung; are not allowed in woodlots.  In 
a few cases, animals are allowed to graze in the woodlot, but only during a drought.   
Woodlots are protected in almost all cases by a guard paid in cash or in kind.  In 
some cases, the guard is compensated by being allowed to collect grass from the woodlot.  
For village-managed woodlots, the village residents pay the guard in most cases; while 





Table 2: Allowed uses of community woodlots 
 






managed  All woodlots 
Grazing  0.6      8.9  2.3 
     (0.6)   (5.7)  (1.3) 
Cut and remove grass  71.1   39.9  64.7 
  (9.5)   (15.0)  (8.3) 
Collect fuelwood  4.4   0.0  3.5 
  (3.9)   (0.0)  (3.1) 
Collect dung   1.0   0.0  0.8 
   (1.0)   (0.0)  (0.8) 
Cut and remove trees or branches   0.0   0.0  0.0 
   (0.0)   (0.0)  (0.0) 
Cut and remove shrubs   0.0   0.0  0.0 
   (0.0)   (0.0)  (0.0) 
Collect leaves   0.0   0.0  0.0 
   (0.0)   (0.0)  (0.0) 
Collect bark   0.0   0.0  0.0 
   (0.0)   (0.0)  (0.0) 
Collect roots   0.0   0.0  0.0 
   (0.0)   (0.0)  (0.0) 
Collect fruits or seeds   60.0   49.1  57.8 
   (9.4)   (15.4)  (8.4) 
Beekeeping   61.1   38.4  56.4 
   (9.6)   (14.2)  (8.4) 
a Means and standard errors are corrected for sampling stratification and weights 
 
more involved.  Thus, it is more common for the local community to hire the guard for 
village-managed than for tabia-managed woodlots (Table 3).  
Violations of restrictions are usually punished by a cash fine set by the 
community council, though in many cases fines are decided by the local court. The most 
common violations of restrictions in 1998 were cutting grass, grazing animals, and 
cutting trees or branches.  Violations are more common on tabia-managed woodlots.  





Table 3: Indicators of collective action to manage woodlots 
 









Number of labor days per capita 
invested in the woodlot in 1998  0.180  0.132  0.165 
  (0.058)  (0.046)  (0.045) 
Percentage of woodlots protected by a 







  (10.9)  (10.3)  (9.2) 
Percentage of woodlots where violations 







  (5.8)  (12.0)  (5.4) 
 








  (2372)  (511)  (1837) 
 







          (5.8)  (9.6)  (5.1) 
a Means and standard errors are corrected for sampling stratification and weights. 
 
but could be much higher for cutting trees.  In some cases a fine of as much as 500 EB 
and imprisonment were imposed for cutting trees. 
Given the limited allowed uses of the woodlots, the benefits received are, not 
surprisingly, small.  Of 164 village-managed woodlots in our sample, benefits were 
reported being received in 1998 from only 57 woodlots, mainly from cutting grass.  
Fewer than half of the households in the villages benefited from grass cutting on average, and 
the average estimated value of benefit was 2,783 EB per woodlot in 1998, only about 2 EB 
per capita in the villages where benefits were received.  The benefits from tabia-managed 
woodlots are even lower, averaging only 352 EB per woodlot, less than 0.10 EB per capita. 
Both local and external organizations play important roles in managing the 





depending on which level manages the woodlot.  These organizations are involved in 
organizing and encouraging participation in woodlot development, developing rules and 
regulations, and financing the guard.   The most important external organization is the 
BoANRD, which is involved mainly in providing material support (including seedlings) 
and technical assistance.   
Villages are pursuing a more intensive strategy of woodlot management than 
tabias. Labor for tree planting, constructing soil and water conservation structures, 
weeding and harrowing is the main collective input, averaging 0.18 person-days per 
capita for village-managed woodlots and 0.13 person-days per capita for tabia-managed 
woodlots.  Village woodlots are also planted much more densely than tabia woodlots.  
The average survival rate is somewhat higher for tabia woodlots, but considering the 
differences in planting densities, the number of surviving trees per hectare is still much 
higher on village woodlots.  Considering the average returns per capita reported above, 
the average return per person-day invested in 1998 was about 10 EB for village-managed 
woodlots (comparable to the daily wage rate in rural Tigray), but less than 1 EB for 
tabia-managed woodlots. 
Of course, the main benefit of a woodlot is not the value of grass collected, but 
the value of the trees in the woodlot, a non-liquidated capital gain.  The most commonly 
planted trees in community woodlots are eucalyptus trees (especially globulos and 
camaldulensis).  The average price of eucalyptus poles in the highlands of Tigray was 
about 28 EB per pole in 1998 (Jagger and Pender, 2000).  Considering the average 
planting density (about 4500 trees per ha.) and survival rate (64 percent) reported in 





EB per ha. on average, and much more in places where wood is very scarce.  With an 
average of more than 70 ha. of woodlots per tabia (9 woodlots averaging almost 8 ha. 
each), this represents a substantial contribution to the wealth of communities in Tigray 
(averaging more than 5 million EB per community). 
Thus, despite the limited amount of current benefits that people are receiving 
from community woodlots in Tigray, community members are generally satisfied that 
they will benefit from them eventually.  Only a small fraction of communities report 
uncertainty about future benefits as a problem, though the problem is more commonly 
reported for tabia-managed than village-managed woodlots.  The survey also inquired 
about other possible problems caused by woodlots, including reduction in grazing area, 
less wood available, pests, conflicts over use, and fire hazards.  Most of these problems 
were generally regarded as minor or non-existent.  In some communities, however, less 
grazing area, less availability of wood, and pests were seen as a major problem.  In 
almost all cases, community members reported that the condition of the area where the 
woodlot was established had improved substantially as a result of the protection and 
investment in developing the woodlot. 
Scarcity of fuelwood is a critical problem in many communities, mainly due to the 
deforestation that has occurred over many years.  In the recent past, however, this 
scarcity may have been aggravated by restrictions on collecting fuelwood from woodlots.  
For example, 13 of the 100 sample villages reported that fuelwood had declined in rank 
as a source of fuel for cooking since 1991 (none reported an increase in importance of 
fuelwood), and in all of these cases, shortage of fuelwood was cited as the reason for the 





several burning of crop residues had increased in importance (the rank of these sources 
did not change in other villages).  Thus, even though restrictions on using woodlots are 
leading to improved conditions of the woodlots, they may be contributing to declining 
soil fertility in the near term as dung and crop residues are increasingly used for fuel, 
rather than being recycled to the soil. 
To summarize the descriptive analysis, we find that woodlots are contributing 
substantially to the wealth of communities in Tigray, even though the near term benefits 
are limited due to restrictions on use.  We find that village-managed woodlots are more 
common and smaller than tabia-managed woodlots, provide more near-term benefits, 
community members invest more effort in managing them, there are fewer violations of 
restrictions in the village woodlots, they are planted much more densely, and the number 
of surviving trees per hectare is also higher, despite somewhat lower survival rates per 
tree planted in village woodlots.  In the next section, we test whether there are 
statistically significant differences in the management and survival of trees on village vs. 
tabia woodlots, controlling for other factors, as well as the other hypotheses presented 
earlier about factors affecting woodlot management.  
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
The initial econometric results are presented in Table 4.  We include dummy 
variables for the different zones of Tigray to proxy for differences in agro-climatic 
potential (the Southern and Western zones have generally higher potential, due to better 
soils and irrigation in the Southern Zone and higher rainfall in the Western Zone), as well 





Table 4: Determinants of collective action and its effectiveness on community woodlots, 1998
a 
 
Explanatory variable  Collective labor input  
(person-days per capita) 
Whether community 
pays for guard 
Whether any violations 
of restrictions occurred 
Number of trees 
planted per hectare 
Survival rate of 
planted trees (%) 
Central zone (cf. Southern 
zone) 
-1.368***  -1.258*  -0.437  -11374**  18.03** 
Eastern zone (cf. Southern 
zone) 
-0.685**  1.060*  -1.509***  2288  17.50** 
Western zone (cf. Southern 
zone) 
-0.744  0.363  -1.029  6853  5.24 
1994 population density (per 
km.
2) 
0.0288**  0.0110  -0.0122  -249.3**  0.0085 
1994  pop. density squared 
 
-0.0000753**  -0.0000601  0.0000387  0.693**  -0.000255 
Distance to woreda town 
(km.) 
0.00653*  -0.00462  -0.00623  241.5**  0.350*** 
Woodlot promoted by 
external organization 
0.611  -1.286***  0.0870  5505  -5.573*** 
Woodlot managed by village 
(cf. managed by tabia) 
-0.136  0.668  -0.158  5114  7.712 
Area of woodlot (ha.) 
 
0.00239  -0.0122  0.00500  -278.3  0.426 
Intercept 
 
-2.823**  0.842  0.900  12067  38.95** 
 
Type of regression  Tobit  Probit  Probit  Least squares  Tobit 
R
2 (if applicable)  NA  NA  NA  0.525  0.436
c 
Number of positive 
observations/total obs. 
66/223  110/219  53/219  76/76
d  73/76
d 
a All regression results are corrected for sampling stratification and sampling weights, and standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and non-independence 
within the primary sampling units (tabias). 
bStatistically significant at the 10% level.   ** Statistically significant at the 5% level.  *** Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
c R
2 for least squares regression on the same data. 






on woodlots by zonal and woreda authorities).  We include population density and 
population density squared to test for an inverted-U shaped relationship between 
population density and collective action.  Market access is represented by distance to the 
woreda (district) town, which is usually where farmers market their produce and 
purchase inputs.  The effect of external organizational presence is investigated by 
including a dummy variable indicating whether the woodlot was promoted by an external 
organization.  Another dummy variable reflects whether the woodlot is village-managed 
or tabia-managed.  Finally, the size of the woodlot is included to investigate whether 
there are economies (or diseconomies) of scale in woodlot protection and management. 
We find that the intensity of management of woodlots (labor input, community 
contribution to protection, and planting density) is lowest in the Central zone of Tigray, 
while survival rate is the highest in this zone (controlling for other differences between 
zones).  This suggests that a less intensive approach to woodlots is being pursued in the 
Central zone, but that this can be consistent with higher survival rates (though lower density 
of surviving trees), probably because of less competition among trees in the less densely 
planted woodlots for water, sunlight and nutrients.  Community labor input is also lower in 
the Eastern zone than in the Southern zone, but community contributions to protecting 
woodlots are greater, leading to fewer violations of restrictions and higher survival rates.  
Thus, the approach to community woodlots in the Eastern zone appears to be oriented 
towards less labor intensity of management but greater effort to protect the trees, with 
favorable impact on tree survival.  We find no statistically significant differences in tree 





We find that the labor intensity of woodlot management is positively associated with 
population density, but negatively associated with population density squared, consistent with 
the hypothesis of an inverse U-shaped relationship between population density and collective 
action.  The turning point in this relationship (where maximum predicted collective labor 
input occurs) is at 191 persons per square km., well within the range of population density 
observed in Tigray (the range in our sample is from 39 to 302 persons per square km.).
3  The 
magnitude of the impact is also substantial: an increase of population density from 40 to 50 
persons per square km. would increase predicted labor input per capita by 0.22 labor days per 
capita (more than the average labor input per capita on woodlots). 
Other indicators of collective action and its effectiveness—including whether the 
community pays for a guard, violations of restrictions and survival rate of trees—also 
show a relationship consistent with the inverted-U hypothesis (with the signs of the 
coefficients reversed for violations of restrictions), though these relationships are 
statistically insignificant.  Unexpectedly, there is a statistically significant U-shaped 
relationship between planting density and population density, with planting density first 
falling and later rising as population density increases (the turning point is at 180 persons 
per square km.).  It may be that lower planting density at moderate population density is a 
result of collective action; i.e., a decision by communities to not overexploit the woodlot 
area by restricting the planting density.  If this is the case, then this relationship also supports 
the hypothesis of an inverse-U relationship between collective action and population density.  
                                                   






However, this is only an ex post hypothesis to explain a result that we did not expect, and 
further research would be needed to confirm or reject this hypothesis. 
With regard to market access, we find that communities that are more remote 
provide greater collective labor input, plant trees more densely, and obtain higher 
survival rates.  These results are both statistically and quantitatively significant: being 10 
km. further from the woreda town increases predicted labor input by 0.06 labor days per 
capita (one-third of average labor input), predicted planting density by 2400 trees per ha. 
and tree survival by 3.5 percentage points.  These findings are consistent with the 
argument that improved market access undermines collective action by increasing labor 
opportunity costs and/or giving people more exit options from the community. 
The presence of external organizations, as indicated by whether the woodlot was 
promoted by an external organization (usually the BoANRD), has a negative association 
with whether the community pays for a guard and with tree survival.  The negative 
association with community payment for a guard is probably due to the fact that external 
organizations often pay for the guard, as discussed earlier, reducing the need for this 
aspect of collective action.  This is similar to results found by Pender and Scherr (1999) 
in Honduras, where external government organizations were found to displace local 
collective action.  The negative association of external promotion with tree survival 
suggests that external programs may not be achieving full participation of local 
communities in promoting woodlots.  Part of the problem may be that local communities 
often prefer to plant eucalyptus, which survive well and grow rapidly under the uncertain-
rainfall of Tigray, whereas external organizations sometimes promote other species that 





Contrary to our expectations, we did not find that collective action was significantly 
greater or more effective on village-managed woodlots than on tabia-managed woodlots, 
after controlling for other factors.  This may be because the differences in benefits, 
community stability or cohesiveness between the tabia level and the village level are 
relatively small; while other factors such as population density, market access or external 
organizations may be more responsible for the differences in collective action found on 
different woodlots.  The area of the woodlot also had a statistically insignificant impact on 
our measures of collective management of woodlots and its effectiveness.  This suggests that 
economies or diseconomies of scale in woodlot management are weak. 
A possible alternative explanation for the weak influence of some variables is that 
there may be multicollinearity among the explanatory variables.  We tested for problems 
of multicollinearity, and found potential problems only between the population density 
and density- squared variables.  The correlation between these variables is almost 0.98, 
leading to high variance inflation factors for these variables (Chatterjee and Price, 1991).  
None of the other explanatory variables has a variance inflation factor greater than 3, 
indicating that multicollinearity is not a major concern for these variables (Ibid.).   
Because of the high correlation between population density and density-squared, 
we repeated the regressions in Table 4 excluding population density squared (Table 5).  
The results are generally very similar, with a few notable exceptions.  Unlike in Table 4, 
we find that population density is negatively associated with the probability that a 
community will pay for a guard and with tree survival.  These effects were masked by the 
multicollinearity, and suggest that population pressure tends to undermine collective 





woodlots have higher survival rates than tabia-managed woodlots in Table 5, with the 
difference being marginally statistically significant (at the 10% level), and quantitatively 
large (10 percentage points).  This effect was also apparently masked by multicollinearity in 
Table 4.  Thus, we do have weak evidence supporting our hypothesis that collective action 
would be more effective on village-managed woodlots, controlling for other factors. 
 
5.   CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Collective action in managing woodlots generally functions well in Tigray, which 
supports the role of community resource management in redressing resource degradation.  
Despite the fact that the communities received little benefits from woodlots by 1998, the 
woodlots contribute substantially to community wealth, and community members are 
generally satisfied with the woodlots as a reserve of natural capital.  Nevertheless, restrictions 
on the use of woodlots appear may be contributing to fuelwood shortages in the near term.   
Benefits were greater and reported problems of managing the woodlots were less 
on woodlots managed at the village level than those managed at the higher tabia level.  
Communities that managed woodlots at the village level applied greater labor inputs, 
planted trees much more densely, more often hired a guard, and less often had violations 
of restrictions.  Although average tree survival (per tree planted) was lower on village- 
managed woodlots, the number of trees surviving per ha. was greater in village woodlots.  
Most of these differences were not found to be statistically significant, however, when 
controlling for other factors, suggesting that other factors besides the level of 
management are more important in determining the extent and effectiveness of collective 








Explanatory variable  Collective labor input  
(person-days per capita) 
Whether community 
pays for guard 
Whether any violations 
of restrictions occurred 
Number of trees 
planted per hectare 
Survival rate of 
planted trees (%) 
Central zone (cf. Southern 
zone) 
-1.547***  -1.280*  -0.374  -8406*  16.94*** 
Eastern zone (cf. Southern 
zone) 
-0.678**  1.027*  -1.478***  3558  17.03** 
Western zone (cf. Southern 
zone) 
-1.076  0.033  -0.686  5268  5.82 
1994 population density (per 
km.
2) 
0.00408*  -0.00788**  0.00157  21.6  -0.0910*** 
Distance to woreda town 
(km.) 
0.00354  -0.00791  -0.00391  274.1**  0.338*** 
Woodlot promoted by 
external organization 
0.3805  -1.392***  0.212  6107  -5.795*** 
Woodlot managed by village 
(cf. managed by tabia) 
-00807  0.763  -0.185  -1770  10.24* 
Area of woodlot (ha.) 
 
-0.00631  -0.0192  0.0113  -242.9  0.413 
Intercept 
 
-0.7519  2.333**  -0.375  -7592  46.18*** 
 
Type of regression  Tobit  Probit  Probit  Least squares  Tobit 
R
2 (if applicable)  NA  NA  NA  0.456  0.435
c 
Number of positive 
observations/total obs. 
66/223  110/219  53/219  76/76
d  73/76
d 
a All regression results are corrected for sampling stratification and sampling weights, and standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and non-
independence within the primary sampling units (tabias). 
bStatistically significant at the 10% level.   ** Statistically significant at the 5% level.  *** Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
c R
2 for least squares regression on the same data. 




We found some support for the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between population density and collective action, especially with respect to collective 
labor input.  However, many of the findings with respect to population density were 
statistically weak, and some suggest that population pressure can undermine collective 
action (especially contribution to protection of woodlots) even at lower levels of 
population density.   
We found that access to markets appears to undermine the intensity of collective 
management of woodlots and its effectiveness in ensuring tree survival, probably because 
this increases the opportunity costs of people’s time and/or the “exit options” of 
community members.  Promotion of woodlots by external organizations appears to 
displace local collective action in protecting the woodlot and contributes to lower tree 
survival rates. 
Our findings imply that collective action can be an effective means of redressing 
resource degradation and increasing community wealth.   However, they also suggest that 
the effectiveness of collective action may be undermined by restrictions that limit the 
benefits of woodlots to local communities, by promotional efforts that displace local 
initiative or promote planting of trees that are less acceptable to local communities, or by 
management at a higher administrative level.  Community management of woodlots, and 
perhaps other natural resources, is likely to be more effective if conducted at the lowest 
level consistent with concerns about distributional issues and externalities, and if external 




Our findings suggest that collective woodlot management is likely to be more 
intensive and effective in communities that are more remote from markets or that have 
low to moderate population density.  In such communities, which are often in lower 
potential areas where agricultural development is difficult to achieve, development and 
management of community woodlots may be a key element of an effective development 
strategy.  In areas of greater market access or high population density, private-oriented 
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Annex: Summary statistics of variables used in regressions 
 
Variable  No. of 
observations 
Mean
a  Standard 
Error
a 
Minimum  Maximum 
Labor days per 
capita 
233  0.165  0.045  0  4.08 
Whether community 
hires a guard 




223  0.228  .054  0  1 
Number of trees 
planted per ha. 
80  4453  1837  333  51750 
Tree survival rate 
(%) 
80  63.7  5.1  0  97.5 
Southern zone  233  0.141  0.049  0  1 
Central zone  233  0.423  0.100  0  1 
Eastern zone  233  0.397  0.100  0  1 




225  154.9  14.7  39.5  301.7 
Distance to woreda 
town (km.) 




227  0.949  0.233  0  1 
Woodlot managed 
by village (cf. 
managed by tabia) 
227  0.799  0.063  0  1 
Area of woodlot 
(ha.) 
227  7.76  1.34  0.13  100 
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